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I. Introduction
Throughout the history of patent law, courts and juries have
struggled to determine the value of a single component in a
multifaceted device or process when that single component alone
is found to have infringed a valid patent.1 Given the intricacies
* Candidate for J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law, May
2013; B.S.N.E., University of Florida, 2010. Special thanks to Professors Josh
Fairfield, Doug Rendleman, and J.D. King for helpful comments and criticisms.
1. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co.,
225 U.S. 604, 617 (1912) (“[Judge Lindley] said in Siddell v. Vickers, 9 Rep. Pat.
Cas. 162, that there ‘was no form of account more difficult to work out tha[n] an
account of profits.’”). As a prelude, note the explicit reference to profits as
opposed to the difficulty involved in deriving a value attributed to a certain
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inherent in electronic devices today, a large number of patents
often cover a single product.2 The difficulties in placing a value on
a single infringed patent incorporated in such a device have
become apparent in several recent cases before the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.3 These cases have
muddled the rules applied in determining patent-infringement
damages. This Note intends to challenge the logic of applying
what has become a court-adopted evidentiary exclusion rule,
known as the entire market value rule (EMVR), to reasonable
royalty determinations. This Note concludes that courts have
transformed what was originally a sword for plaintiffs into a
shield for defendants without clearly justifying the change under
remedies law principles.4
II. Present State of Patent Damages Law
Pursuant to constitutional authority, Congress has
authorized limited-term monopolies, in the form of patents, to be
granted to inventors for their inventions.5 The limited monopoly
seeks to give adequate incentive for undertaking financial risks
associated with invention, while still providing competition in the
market over the long term.6 The United States Patent and
Trademark Office decides whether to grant or deny a patent after
application for one, but when a patent holder alleges
component more abstractly. Juries are referenced because the amount of
damages in patent infringement cases is a question of fact. See Smithkline
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(“[T]he amount of a prevailing party’s damages is a finding of fact.”).
2. See, e.g., Lindsey Gilroy & Tammy D’Amato, How Many Patents Does It
Take to Build an iPhone?, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TODAY, http://www.
iptoday.com/issues/2009/11/articles/how-many-patents-take-build-iPhone.asp
(last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (explaining that the iPhone is covered by at least 200
patents) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See infra Part IV.
4. Thanks to Professor Doug Rendleman for this useful metaphor.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see 35 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“Whoever invents
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”).
6. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES–EQUITY–RESTITUTION 33 (2d
ed. 1993).
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infringement, federal courts typically decide on the patent’s
ultimate validity.7 A valid patent is infringed if another party
makes, uses, or sells the patented invention without the
patentee’s consent.8 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from final
decisions of a federal district court when the underlying civil
action arises under the patent statute.9
Section 284 of Title 35 of the United States Code10 provides
that “[u]pon finding for the claimant [a] court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement,
but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of
the invention by the infringer.”11 The statute, based on the Patent
Act of 1946, has been interpreted since 1964 as precluding the
remedy of disgorgement of the infringer’s profits related to a
utility patent.12 In the event of a conscious and willful
infringement, the court may decide to “increase the [total
damages award] up to three times the amount [of compensation
damages] assessed.”13 Thus, punitive damages are available
under the statute. Furthermore, courts may grant injunctions
prohibiting an infringer from further infringement subject to the
“traditional four-factor framework that governs the award of
injunctive relief.”14
7. Id. The validity of a patent may also be challenged during
reexamination or post-grant review. See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2006) (allowing inter
partes reexamination); 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2006) (allowing ex parte
reexamination); 35 U.S.C.A. § 321 (West 2012) (allowing for post-grant review).
8. Id.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
11. Id.
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42
cmt. b (2011). Congress has authorized three broad types of patents: utility
patents, 35 U.S.C. §101 (2006), design patents, 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006), and plant
patents, 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2006).
13. Union Carbide Corp. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 282 F.2d 653, 675 (7th
Cir. 1960). Other situations may also lead to imposition of punitive damages.
See Laskowitz v. Marie Designer, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 541, 554 (S.D. Cal. 1954)
(stating that a court may award punitive damages when there is oppressive or
fraudulent conduct on the part of the defendant).
14. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006). The four
factors that an injunction-seeking plaintiff must demonstrate are:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
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In court, a patentee has two options when seeking
compensation from an infringer. First, the patentee may seek
profits that it lost due to the existence of the infringer’s product
in the marketplace.15 In seeking lost profits, a patentee must
show that but for infringement, it would have made additional
sales or could have charged a higher price for its own product.16
This can be accomplished, for example, by establishing the four
factors expressed in Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works:17
(1) the patented feature was in demand; (2) the patentee had the
capability to manufacture and market the patented feature to
fulfill that demand; (3) there were no noninfringing substitutes
available to the infringer; and (4) a profit would have been made
on the additional sales.18
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by
a permanent injunction.
Id. at 391; see also John M. Golden, Injunctions as More (Or Less) than “Off
Switches:” Patent-infringement Injunctions’ Scope, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1399 (2012).
15. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(describing the lost-profits determination as a “but for” analysis limited by
“objective foreseeability”).
16. See id. (establishing a but-for test).
17. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156
(6th Cir. 1978). In Panduit, Panduit Corporation successfully sued Stahlin
Brothers for infringing a patent “covering duct for wiring of electrical control
systems.” Id. at 1155. As part of the proceedings below, a master was appointed
to determine Panduit’s deserved damages. Id. The master’s report found that
the plaintiff failed to establish sufficient evidence of lost profits, and the report
recommended a reasonable royalty. Id. at 1155–56. This report was adopted by
the district court below. Id. at 1155. Panduit appealed the decision, arguing that
it was entitled to lost profits on lost sales and price competition. Id. In the
alternative, it sought a higher reasonable royalty rate. Id. The court of appeals
denied the lost profits argument, ruling that there was insufficient evidence to
establish the amount of profit it would have made. Id. at 1156. But the court of
appeals agreed with Panduit on the insufficiency of evidence to support the
master’s reasonable royalty (which was lowered due to his conclusion that there
were acceptable noninfringing substitutes on the market). Id. at 1162. The case
was remanded to reexamine the royalty based on (1) the lack of acceptable
noninfringing substitutes; (2) Panduit’s policy of not licensing the patent at
issue; (3) the future business and profit Panduit would expect to lose by
licensing at the time of initial infringement; and (4) the fact that the infringed
patent gave the entire marketable value to the product sold. Id. at 1164.
18. Id. at 1156. These factors are not the exclusive means of proving lost
profits. See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1545.
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If a patentee cannot prove lost profits, the default measure of
damages is no less than a reasonable royalty for the infringed
patent.19 A reasonable royalty has been defined as the amount
that “a person, desiring to manufacture and sell a patented
article, as a business proposition, would be willing to pay as a
royalty and yet be able to make and sell the patented article, in
the market, at a reasonable profit.”20 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v.
United States Plywood Corp.21 is the seminal case setting forth
the factors courts weigh when determining a reasonable royalty.
Most often, this involves reconstructing a hypothetical licensing
negotiation between a willing licensor and a willing licensee on
the date of initial infringement.22 Typically, an established
royalty rate for the same patented component will be the
controlling factor.23 In the absence of an established royalty rate,
the other Georgia-Pacific factors are considered in determining

19. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (stating that damages adequate to
compensate for infringement should “in no event [be] less than a reasonable
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer”).
20. Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1157–58 (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Overman Cushion Tire Co., 95 F.2d 978, 984 (6th Cir. 1937)).
21. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1116
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified sub nom. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. PlywoodChampion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). In Georgia-Pacific, U.S.
Plywood (USP) successfully proved infringement of one of its patents for striated
fir plywood in the proceedings prior. Id. at 1117. A special master was appointed
to determine USP’s compensatory damages. Id. The award of $685,837 was
based on Georgia-Pacific’s (GP) profit on the sale of the infringing article. Id.
The judge presiding over the trial took exception to the master’s report, and
found that GP’s profits were not the proper measure of recovery, but rather, the
proper measure was a reasonable royalty. Id. The court then analyzed several
factors in coming to a reasonable royalty of $50 per thousand square feet of the
patented product, amounting to $800,000. Id. at 1120–43. It should be noted
that apportionment was not applied in the court’s analysis because the “patent
was not one for an improvement on an article nor was GP’s infringement of a
patented feature sold together with unpatented parts. [The patent covered] a
marketable article—a panel of striated fir plywood—as an entirety.” Id. at 1132.
22. See Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 518 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (stating that the royalty should not be based on an “after-the-fact
assessment”). This is an oft-reiterated point of analysis that courts should
consider banishing. The benefit of hindsight allows a court to craft an equitable
result for both parties.
23. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 978–79 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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what a reasonable royalty would have been at the time of initial
infringement.24
To fully grasp this Note’s central argument, it will be useful
to have an understanding of what these factors are. As stated in
Georgia-Pacific, the factors relevant to making a reasonable
royalty determination are:
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing
of the patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an
established royalty.
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other
patents comparable to the patent in suit.
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or
non-exclusive; or as restricted or non-restricted in
terms of territory or with respect to whom the
manufactured product may be sold.
4. The licensor’s established policy and marketing
program to maintain his patent monopoly by not
licensing others to use the invention or by granting
licenses under special conditions designed to preserve
that monopoly.
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and
licensee, such as, whether they are competitors in the
same territory in the same line of business; or whether
they are inventor and promoter.
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in
promoting sales of other products of the licensee; the
existing value of the invention to the licensor as a
generator of sales of his non-patented items; and the
extent of such derivative or convoyed sales.
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
8. The established profitability of the product made
under the patent; its commercial success; and its
current popularity.
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over
the old modes or devices, if any, that had been used for
working out similar results.

24. See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1121 (stating that there was an
absence of an established royalty, and thus, it was “necessary to resort to a
broad spectrum of other evidentiary facts probative of a ‘reasonable’ royalty”).
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10. The nature of the patented invention, the character of
the commercial embodiment of it as owned and
produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who
have used the invention.
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the
invention; and any evidence probative of the value of
that use.
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that
may be customary in the particular business or in
comparable businesses to allow for the use of the
invention or analogous inventions.
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be
credited to the invention as distinguished from nonpatented elements, the manufacturing process,
business risks, or significant features or improvements
added by the infringer.
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and
a licensee (such as the infringer) would have agreed
upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had
been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an
agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent
licensee—who desired, as a business proposition, to
obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular
article embodying the patented invention—would have
been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to
make a reasonable profit and which amount would
have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was
willing to grant a license.25

If a running royalty is presumed, the reasonable royalty
calculation requires the parties to ascertain both the royalty base
and the royalty rate.26 The base is the total amount to which the
rate is applied in determining the damages owed by the
infringer.27 If a lump-sum royalty is presumed, there are
additional factors to consider, including the risk discount
involved in the lump-sum valuation.28
25. Id. at 1120.
26. Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 286
(N.D.N.Y. 2009).
27. Id.
28. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
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Taking only the above explanation of the current state of the
law, it appears that courts have crafted a logical process for
evaluating what a patent embedded in a device covered by a sea
of patents would be worth in calculating a patentee’s damages.
Even if a hypothetical negotiation at the time of the infringement
seems nearly impossible to ascertain, its ultimate purpose is at
least objectively fair: to give the patentee what it would have
received had the infringer obtained a license in the first instance.
This goal aligns with the patent-statute’s goal of providing the
patentee with damages adequate to compensate it for the
infringement.29
Special attention should be directed to Georgia-Pacific factor
thirteen, which offers as relevant to the reasonable royalty
calculation “[t]he portion of the realizable profit that should be
credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented
elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or
significant features or improvements added by the infringer.”30
This evaluation, historically called apportionment, is arguably
the fairest starting point for retroactively forging a reasonable
royalty.31 The “realizable profit . . . credited to the invention”
impliedly requires introducing into evidence the market value of
the product that includes the patented component; otherwise,
there is no base profit value to apportion.32 Similarly, factor eight
refers to the “established profitability of the product made under
the patent;”33 the language implies a consideration of the profits
made after a hypothetical negotiation, but before the instant
2009) (discussing the benefits and risks of a lump sum payment in a typical
licensing agreement).
29. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
30. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified sub nom. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. PlywoodChampion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
31. See Eric E. Benson & Danielle M. White, Using Apportionment To Rein
In the Georgia-Pacific Factors, 9 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 46 (2008)
(arguing that “apportionment should be a required part of every reasonable
royalty analysis, not just a factor that may or may not be given any weight”).
The Article continues with the argument that the reasonable royalty calculation
should not only be bounded by the profits attributable to the infringed patent
but also by some portion of those profits since a prudent licensee would not seek
a license if it did not yield some profit for itself. Id. at 47.
32. Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
33. Id.
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litigation. Thus, it is important to note that apportionment has
been recognized to be one element of the reasonable-royalty
analysis.
Patent damages are meant to be compensatory, meaning the
measurement should be based on the plaintiff’s loss, rather than
the defendant’s gain.34 The damages determination starts with
the patentee trying to prove its lost profits, and if that fails, then
it tries to prove a reasonable royalty based on a hypothetical
negotiation informed by other factors. Although this Note makes
the argument that a reasonable royalty should almost always be
informed by the profits on the infringing product, presently, the
reasonable royalty analysis is being perverted to exclude such
profits in instances involving a product covered by numerous
patented and nonpatented components.35
Eric Benson and Danielle White propound that a
hypothetical negotiation seeking to compensate a patentee via a
reasonable royalty should be informed by the actual profits made
on a product incorporating the infringed patent—stating that
“apportionment should be a threshold determination in every
reasonable royalty analysis.”36 There is much to be said for this
suggestion. Less convincing, however, is their necessarily
bounding a patentee’s potential royalty by the infringer’s
profits.37 Under such a limitation, a patentee’s compensation for
the lost opportunity to bargain for a license could be
circumvented by an inefficient infringer. Nevertheless, Benson
and White’s argument implicitly recognizes the importance of
using the income attributable to the entire product even if the
patented component at issue is not the basis for the product’s
demand in the market.
The reason for introducing an infringing product’s profits,
even if the infringed patent does not contribute the basis for
demand for that product, is that it gives the jury concrete
34. Doug Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution: Coordinating Restitution
with Compensatory Damages and Punitive Damages, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
973, 980 (2011).
35. See infra Part III (discussing the EMVR).
36. Benson & White, supra note 31, at 46–48.
37. See id. at 2 (“By treating apportionment as a threshold question, courts
can ensure that the resulting reasonable royalty award is properly confined to a
portion of the profit attributable to the patent.”).
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evidence of what the patent might be worth to the infringer, and
this evidence would be relevant to determining what amount the
infringer would have agreed to pay as a royalty.38 With such
evidence before a jury, it is unlikely that any infringement of a
minor component, taken alone, would threaten the infringing
entity with major economic disruption. It therefore helps to avoid
uninformed awards that may wander into the punitive category.
At the same time, the patentee’s compensation is necessarily in
correlation to the patent’s contribution to the product
incorporating it rather than some abstractly determined value.
An infringer would likely have made the licensing decision with
respect to the perceived value of the overall product. Actual
profits provide an objective, reliable value for the jury in cases in
which the opposing parties’ experts often provide largely
divergent royalty estimates.39
Even if the compensatory nature of patent damages could
rebut bounding reasonable royalties by an infringer’s profits, the
profits on the infringing product should still be considered an
essential factor in a hypothetical negotiation.40 But the
importation of the EMVR into reasonable royalty determinations
has, in effect, needlessly made this factor nearly impossible to get
into evidence.

38. Note that the present state of the law does not provide a right to an
accounting of profits. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F.
Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified sub nom. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v.
U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971) (referring to
profits as a factor to be considered). The proposed method essentially seeks to
place far greater weight on actual profits than present law effectually allows in
the reasonable royalty analysis.
39. See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1318–20
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (stating that Microsoft’s expert suggested a royalty of
$7 million, and Uniloc’s expert suggested a royalty of nearly $565 million).
40. The language of the patent damages statute does not clearly preclude
classifying reasonable royalties as restitutionary. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 284
(2006) (providing that in no event should a patentee of an infringed patent be
awarded less than a “reasonable royalty”), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 50 cmt. e (2011) (providing that the
remedy in restitution for an innocent recipient of some unjust enrichment is
measured by a “reasonable value” standard).
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III. Enter the Entire Market Value Rule
Before addressing a present point of confusion in patent
damage calculations, it is useful to examine the definition and
origin of the EMVR. In seeking to elicit the present justification
behind the rule, this Note will compare the rule’s original logic to
how it is being applied by courts today.
The EMVR, most near its original understanding, allows a
patentee to recover damages that encompass unpatented features
sold with the patented feature if: (1) the patented feature is the
basis for customer demand for the entire product or products sold;
(2) the patentee reasonably anticipates the sale of the unpatented
parts along with the patented component; and (3) there is a
functional relatedness between the patented and unpatented
components.41 The idea is that whatever value was contributed by
the unpatented components would not have been realized without
the patented component—it was the reason the entire product
had market value at all.42 Note that the entire market value rule
is not clearly an evidentiary exclusion rule; rather, it is an
affirmative grant of a degree of recovery provided the requisite
elements are met. Plainly interpreted, the rule allows the
patentee to recover the full value of an infringing product if the
infringing component, on its own, drove demand.43
Presumably, the patentee would have captured the value of
the unpatented components itself, but for infringement. Thus, the
rule seems to make sense when viewed in conjunction with the
lost-profits analysis. But, in actuality, the EMVR does not fully
comport with the language of the patent statute even in lostprofits scenarios absent proof of the patentee’s plans and
capability to manufacture the entire device.
One of the earliest cases in which the rule appears is
Garretson v. Clark.44 The patent at issue in Garretson was an
41. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549–51 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (providing a summary of the EMVR case law).
42. See id.
43. See id. at 1549 (“We have held that the entire market value rule
permits recovery of damages based on the value of a patentee’s entire apparatus
containing several features when the patent-related feature is the ‘basis for
customer demand.’”).
44. Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120 (1884).
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improvement for a method of fastening mop-heads.45 The
patentee proved infringement and sought all of the infringer’s
profits in damages.46 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court’s denial of all of the infringer’s profits, invoking the EMVR:
The patentee . . . must in every case give evidence tending to
separate or apportion the defendant’s profits and the
patentee’s damages between the patented feature and the
unpatented features, and such evidence must be reliable and
tangible, and not conjectural or speculative; or he must show,
by equally reliable and satisfactory evidence, that the
profits and damages are to be calculated on the whole
machine, for the reason that the entire value of the whole
machine, as a marketable article, is properly and legally
attributable to the patented feature.47

Thus, Garretson provided two clear alternatives: (1) apportion the
infringer’s profits and the patentee’s lost profits according to the
value of the patent, or (2) prove that the entire value of the
product is derived from the patented component to receive the
full value of the profits associated with the product, sold by the
patentee, which incorporated the patented component.48 Note
how these two choices are restitutionary in nature, with the
damages being measured by the defendant’s gain attributable to
the patented component. There was no requirement that the
patentee prove manufacturing capability or any other factor
supporting a claim of actual loss.
If Garretson had produced the requisite evidence to prove
that his improvement was worth 25% of the value of a mop, the
rule would apportion to Garretson that amount of the infringer’s
net profits (this restitutionary measure is no longer available).49
Note that an improvement that contributed 25% of the value of a
mop would mathematically not constitute the basis of consumer
demand, yet the original rule (in conjunction with the
apportionment alternative) would necessarily allow into evidence
the entire amount of profits made on the infringing product. This

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 121.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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understanding of the rule continued into the early twentieth
century.
In Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v. Wagner
Electric & Manufacturing Co.,50 the U.S. Supreme Court found
Wagner to have infringed a patent for an electrical transformer
incorporating a nonconducting cooling oil.51 Prior to reaching the
Supreme Court, it was determined that Wagner had made a
profit of $132,433 on infringing transformers, but because
Westinghouse failed to prove what portion of the profits was
attributable to the infringement, it was only awarded nominal
damages.52 Note that this case was decided before the present
patent-damages statute was enacted. In this case, the Court
correctly delineated between apportionment and recovery of all of
an infringer’s profits. The Court, in describing the law, stated
that when the patent “is only part of the machine and creates
only part of the profits[,] . . . [the plaintiff] is only entitled to
recover that part of the net gains.”53 It then quoted Garretson’s
delineation between apportioning defendant’s profits and
awarding the entirety of the profits (as would be the case if the
EMVR were satisfied).54
Although the Court sensibly explained the EMVR in
Garretson, later, lower court decisions expanded it from a rule
requiring a threshold to be met in recovering all of the infringer’s
profits to a rule that excluded evidence of the infringer’s profits in
the reasonable royalty context. The confusion appears to have
originated in Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. United States,55
when the United States Court of Claims found that the patent at
50. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co., 225 U.S.
604 (1912).
51. Id. at 607.
52. Id. at 614.
53. Id. at 614–15.
54. Id. at 615.
55. Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 1 (1942), aff’d in
part and vacated in part on other grounds, 320 U.S. 1 (1943). The Court of
Claims was abolished in 1982. Note that while the Court of Claims was
meddling with the EMVR’s original application, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit was remaining true to it. See Cover v. Chi. Eye Shield Co., 130
F.2d 25, 28–30 (7th Cir. 1942) (affirming the master’s finding that, because the
entire market value of infringing device was not attributable to the patent at
issue, the profits from the device had to be apportioned).
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issue “substantially created the value of the component parts
utilized in radio transmitters and receivers purchased . . . and
that it therefore falls within the [EMVR]. The complete cost of the
transmitting and receiving sets [was] used as the base in the
application of a reasonable royalty.”56 Marconi dealt with a
reasonable royalty, a compensatory measure, and thus it can be
seen as expanding the applicability of the EMVR. The Court of
Claims did not claim that Marconi’s patent was the basis for
consumer demand; rather, it created a new standard, claiming
that it “substantially created the value of the component parts.”57
The court in Marconi applied the EMVR and lowered the
standard—from “the basis of consumer demand” to “substantially
created value”—but did not totally abrogate the rule. The court
did not explicitly provide its reasons for doing so, but based on a
reading of the facts, some possible justifications present
themselves. First, the court may have recognized that in the
valuation of a component in a device as complex as the radio was
at the time, it would be difficult to pinpoint one component that
was the basis for demand. Implicit in this reasoning is that the
market value of the product is an essential tool in placing a value
on a single component of that product. Second, creating a tension
with the first point, the court likely recognized that, as devices
were beginning to interact with large numbers of other devices, it
would become necessary to limit the royalty base in some manner
to protect against applying inherently uncertain royalty rates to
exorbitant royalty bases. A good example of this today is a
patentee of a computer program (other than something as
integral as an operating system) seeking damages based on the
market value of a desktop computer sold by the infringer.
Although these presumed concerns are valid, the Marconi
court’s standard was far too restrictive when applied, essentially,
as an evidentiary rule in reasonable royalty scenarios—that is, by
excluding the profit made on the entire product from evidence
when the standard is not met. A major problem with the court’s
reasoning is its belief that it had to invoke the EMVR, a progeny
of restitution, when in fact it was calculating a compensatory
reasonable royalty. Thus, in Marconi, two remedies theories—
56.
57.

Id. at 49.
Id.
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those of damages and restitution—were obscured and a legal
device was forged to limit what is often times the only reliable
evidence available to ensure that a royalty is indeed reasonable.
It is important to note that in 1952, Congress passed the present
patent statute, including 35 U.S.C. § 284, which provided for
damages “adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no
event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the
invention by the infringer.” It is difficult to rectify the continued
existence of the restitutionary EMVR with this codification.
Interestingly, the “reasonable royalty” measure of damages
arose out of evidentiary proof difficulties when courts sought to
apportion profits in disgorgement scenarios.58 Courts have
interpreted the patent statute’s granting of compensatory
damages or a reasonable royalty as precluding the remedy of
disgorgement.59 While this interpretation is arguably
questionable,60 it need not be erroneous to logically align with
this Note’s modest proposal. Determining a reasonable royalty
and apportioning an infringer’s profits both initially aim to find
what value the patent contributes to the overall product.61 The
patent statute’s reference to a “reasonable royalty” may preclude
disgorgement of profits related to an infringed patent, but it does
not necessarily preclude calculating a royalty in reference to the
infringer’s profits. Thus, a balance can be struck between full
disgorgement under a restitutionary theory and the exclusion of
profits entirely from consideration in a reasonable royalty
calculation.62 A more nuanced evidentiary standard makes more
sense than a categorical bar.
58. Caprice L. Roberts, The Case for Restitution and Unjust Enrichment
Remedies in Patent Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 653, 659–60 (2010).
59. See id. at 661 (“[C]ourt opinions interpreted the alteration as
eliminating the patent owner's traditional equitable remedy of an accounting of
the infringer’s profits.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). The
legislative history for the patent statute does elicit an attitude against using
apportionment in every infringement suit. See S. REP. NO. 79-1503, at 2 (1946)
(stating that it is impossible to apportion profits due to an improvement patent
in a complex machine and referring to the associated long, expensive road to
dubious justice in that pursuit).
60. See Roberts, supra note 58, at 661–64 (discussing the ambiguous
reasoning behind excising an accounting of profits from the patent statute).
61. See supra Part II (discussing the patent remedies law).
62. See Roberts, supra note 58, at 683–84 (arguing that under existing law,
reference to an infringer’s profits should be allowed when there is a relevant
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IV. Recent Cases Applying the Rule

To illustrate the issue, it is necessary to analyze how recent
cases have applied the EMVR. In Lucent Technologies, Inc. v.
Gateway, Inc.,63 Lucent initially brought a patent infringement
claim against Gateway for a method patent involving entering
information into fields on a computer screen without the use of a
keyboard.64 Microsoft Corporation subsequently intervened, and
Lucent alleged indirect infringement of the patent by Microsoft’s
sale of Microsoft Money, Microsoft Outlook, and Windows
Mobile.65 The jury awarded $357,693,056.18 to Lucent after
finding Microsoft liable on claims covering all three products.66
On appeal, Microsoft argued that “the jury should not have
applied the entire market value rule to the value of its three
software products.”67 At trial, the parties agreed that the measure
of damages was to be determined using a hypothetical negotiation
in accord with Georgia-Pacific.68 Under this approach, Lucent
sought a running royalty, but Microsoft argued it would have
paid a lump sum of $6.5 million for the rights to incorporate the
patented method in its products.69 Because the jury indicated
that its award was a lump-sum payment, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit sought to determine whether
there was substantial evidence to find that Microsoft would have
paid nearly $358 million up front for the use of the patent.70
In support of its finding that there was not substantial
evidence to support the award, the court cited precedent stating
that “‘[t]he issue of the infringer’s profit is to be determined not
on the basis of a hindsight evaluation of what actually happened,
but on the basis of what the parties to the hypothetical license
negotiations would have considered at the time of the
bearing on calculating a reasonable royalty).
63. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
64. Id. at 1308; see also U.S. Patent No. 4,763,356 (filed Dec. 11, 1986)
(describing the patented technology).
65. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1308.
66. Id. at 1309.
67. Id. at 1323.
68. Id. at 1325.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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negotiations.’”71 The court seemingly disregarded this logic,
however, in claiming that evidence regarding the frequency of use
by the infringing users of the software programs was not barred,
even though that particular evidence originated after the
hypothetical negotiation.72 It is unclear why evidence of actual
use of the patented method would be helpful in determining the
reasonableness of a royalty while evidence of actual profit from
the infringing product would not be. If “‘[e]xperience is . . .
available to correct uncertain prophecy’”73 on evidence of actual
use, why not on evidence of actual profits? Both would necessarily
be matters of speculation during a hypothetical negotiation.74
Microsoft claimed that the jury must have applied some
percentage rate to the entire market value of its infringing
products relevant to the award determination.75 Microsoft
claimed that this was an improper application of the EMVR.76
The court recognized that “it is difficult to understand how the
jury could have chosen its lump-sum figure down to the penny
unless it used a running royalty calculation.”77 Note that from a
negotiation standpoint, while there is a difference between a
lump sum and a running royalty, the lump sum will be
mathematically
connected
to
a
running
royalty—as
determination of a lump sum will be based on a speculated
running royalty, discounted to present value, with further
discounts for risk.78
Here, the court agreed that, if the jury applied the EMVR, it
would have been error.79 This statement is correct as applied to
71. Id. at 1333 (quoting Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d
1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
72. See id. at 1333–34 (“[Evidence of frequency of usage], assuming it
meets admissibility requirements, ought to be given its proper weight, as
determined by the circumstances of each case.”).
73. Id. at 1333 (quoting Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co.,
289 U.S. 689, 698 (1933)).
74. The Federal Circuit’s recent reliance on a “smallest salable patentpracticing unit” test fails to take this into account. LaserDynamics, Inc. v.
Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 66–67 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
75. Id. at 1323.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1336.
78. See id. at 1327 (analyzing an expert’s determination of a lump sum).
79. Id.
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the historical meaning of the EMVR. Recall that the EMVR was
originally applied to allow the patentee to recover all of the
infringer’s profits when a product was not entirely covered by an
infringed patent, but the patent was nevertheless the basis for
consumer demand.80 The high threshold of proving that a
component was the basis of demand was presumably necessary
because depriving the infringer of the entirety of its profits is a
harsh result. But the court of appeals did not follow this line of
reasoning.
The court found two problems with applying the EMVR,
which it interpreted as allowing an award to be associated with
the entire market value of a product even if a low royalty rate
was applied. First, there was no evidence that the patent
provided the basis of consumer demand.81 Second, the court
criticized the methodology employed by Lucent’s expert.82 The
expert initially applied a royalty rate to the price of an entire
computer, but when the district court excluded this from
evidence, the expert increased his royalty rate as applied to the
software price and came to the same number as when he used the
aggregate computer sales as the royalty base.83 Although the
court should be concerned with deceptive tactics, it appears that
this criticism of the expert’s royalty-rate inflation weighs more
toward the quality of the evidence and does not justify excluding
the price of the software from the royalty base if the patentee
could prove what value of that price was profit attributable to the
infringed patent.
The court itself acknowledged this point in dictum, which
was rebuked in subsequent cases, when it stated, “Simply put,
the base used in a running royalty calculation can always be the
value of the entire commercial embodiment, as long as the
80. See supra notes 41–57 and accompanying text (explaining the EMVR).
81. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (“The first flaw with any application of the entire market value rule in the
present case is the lack of evidence demonstrating the patented method of the
Day patent as the basis—or even a substantial basis—of the consumer demand
for Outlook.”).
82. See id. at 1338 (“The second flaw with any application of the entire
market value rule in this case lies in the approach adopted by Lucent’s licensing
expert.”).
83. Id.

A CASE AGAINST THE ENTIRE MARKET VALUE RULE 2251
magnitude of the rate is within an acceptable range (as
determined by the evidence).”84 It was not necessary for the court
to rule on the issue of whether the jury erroneously applied the
EMVR because it found that there was not substantial evidence
to support the damages award regardless, but it is more than
apparent that the award would have been reversed on EMVR
grounds had it been necessary to decide the issue.85 The damages
award did not give the entire market value or all of the profits to
the patentee. Thus, when the court claimed that a lack of
evidence proving the patented component was the basis for
consumer demand of the software programs was fatal to the
application of the EMVR, it is apparent that the court believed
the EMVR was applied even though the award amounted to
approximately 5.5% of the total sales revenue of the infringing
product.86 The court implied that the EMVR is applied when the
market value of the product is used as the royalty base. This
implication parallels the reasoning in Marconi87 but runs counter
to the court’s dicta quoted above. The tension in the court of
appeals’s logic would be resolved—incorrectly, this Note asserts—
two years later in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.88
In Uniloc, the patent at issue was directed at preventing
unauthorized installation of copied software.89 Uniloc alleged that
Microsoft’s Product Activation feature on Microsoft Word XP,
Word 2003, and Windows XP infringed the patent.90 The jury

84. Id. at 1338–39.
85. See id. at 1338 (arguing the flaws with applying EMVR in this case).
Again, because the patentee was not seeking the entirety of Microsoft’s profits,
the EMVR, as originally understood, was not applied. Note how applying the
“substantial evidence” standard allowed the court to overturn the large damages
award without any need for the EMVR. This provides further support for
abrogating the EMVR entirely.
86. Id. at 1336–38. It is not clear why the experts did not focus on the net
profits, which are what this Note encourages courts to look to in solving the
problem of unjust damage awards. Of course, this evidence should be subject to
other admissibility considerations.
87. See infra Part III (discussing Marconi).
88. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
89. Id. at 1296; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,490,216 (filed Sept. 21, 1993)
(describing the patented product). An understanding of the functionality of the
patented process is not necessary for the purposes of this Note.
90. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1296.
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found infringement and awarded Uniloc $388 million.91 Uniloc’s
expert explained to the jury, based on a document internal to
Microsoft, that product activation keys could be worth anywhere
from $10 to $10,000 each, depending on usage—instead of
installing a copy of the software, users will presumably have to
buy the software to get a valid key.92 The expert then took the
lowest estimated value, $10, and assumed this was the isolated
value of the patent per product license sold.93 He then utilized the
25% rule-of-thumb, which presumes that 25% of the value of the
patent would go to the patent owner and the rest would go to the
party selling the product.94 Thus, $2.50 per license was
attributable to the patent.95 After finding that the Georgia-Pacific
factors balanced out, the expert applied the $2.50 rate to the total
number of Office and Windows product licenses sold and
determined that $565 million was a reasonable royalty.96 As a
check to this calculation, the expert then estimated gross
revenues for the products by multiplying the total number of
licenses by the average sales price per license, yielding a gross
revenue value of $19.28 billion.97 Thus, the royalty rate turned
out to be 2.9% of the estimated gross revenues.98 He then opined
that this was reasonable because, in his experience, royalty rates
for software are on average generally above 10%.99
This methodology of creating the value of the infringed
patent from scratch, instead of first apportioning profits, should
only be resorted to in the rare case in which a defendant cannot
produce evidence of the profits for the larger device of which the
infringed patent is a component. The concern that the conclusion
in the expert’s methodology might be seen as fair, because there
is a low royalty percentage, is deceiving partially because he is
comparing the royalty to revenues instead of profits; the
91. Id. at 1311.
92. Id. (citing Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150
n.2 (D.R.I. 2009)).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1318.
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manufacturer is bearing all the risk, and this is reflected in the
market price. This illustrates why the reasonable royalty
calculation should, in most instances, be tied to net profits. Of
course, it would be more helpful if the parties actually presented
evidence on net profits instead of just gross revenues.
Microsoft contested the admission of the expert’s testimony,
alleging that it used the EMVR, even if it was only part of the
check on the reasonable royalty calculation.100 Microsoft’s
contention was based on Uniloc’s lack of evidence proving that
the product activation feature was the basis of consumer demand
for the product.101 The district court granted a new trial on
damages based on this alone, stating that the “$19 billion cat was
never put back into the bag.”102 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit affirmed.103 First, the court found that the
application of a 25% rule-of-thumb was arbitrary and
inadmissible under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
and the Federal Rules of Evidence.104 Second, the court addressed
Microsoft’s allegation that the expert’s check was an inadmissible
application of the EMVR.105 After aptly laying out the law, citing
Lucent, Rite-Hite, and Garretson, the court of appeals agreed with
the district court’s finding that the “entire market value of Office
and Windows in the form of the $19 billion figure was ‘irrelevant’
and ‘taint[ed]’ the jury’s damages award.”106 The court of appeals
then resolved the tension in logic described in Lucent, stating
that “[t]he Supreme Court and this court’s precedents do not
allow consideration of the entire market value of accused
products for minor patent improvements simply by asserting a
low enough royalty rate.”107
100. Id. at 1312.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1321.
104. Id. at 1315 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993)).
105. Id. at 1318.
106. Id. at 1319 (alteration in original).
107. Id. at 1320 (citations omitted). It seems that there is a
misinterpretation of the phrase based on. As originally intended, to award
damages based on the entire value of the product means to give the entirety of
the profits. See Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884) (focusing on the
profits to determine damages).
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Following this logic, evidence of the entire market value of a
product will not even be admitted unless the patented component
is proven to provide the basis of demand. What started as a
standard for finding that a patentee was entitled to the entire
value of a product—a sword for plaintiffs—has essentially been
broadened into an evidentiary admissibility standard—a shield
for defendants. Considering the complexity inherent in
technology today, there is little chance that a single component
will ever be the basis of consumer demand. The market value of a
product in which a patented component is incorporated informs
rather than taints a jury in its quest of finding a reasonable
royalty. The Federal Circuit’s decision with respect to the EMVR
is blind to the patent damages statute’s construction and to how
the EMVR has been perverted since it was promulgated by the
Supreme Court.
V. District Courts and the EMVR
The error in the application of the EMVR is spreading. It can
be found in district courts that are now relying on Uniloc. In
Mirror Worlds, L.L.C. v. Apple, Inc.,108 the patents at issue
involved a document stream operating system and method that
stored documents in a chronological order that was transparent
to the user.109 The user could scroll through the documents in a
stack and see a miniature version of the document before
accessing it.110 The patentee claimed that Apple’s operating
systems and mobile devices (the iPhone, iPod, and iPad) infringed
the patents.111 To determine the revenue pool, Mirror Worlds
“used both software and hardware incorporating the accused
[operating system] to calculate a $72 billion royalty base.”112
Mirror Worlds argued that the EMVR did not apply.113 This
argument was correct as applied to the originally promulgated
108.
2011).
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Mirror Worlds, LLC v. Apple, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 2d 703 (E.D. Tex.
Id. at 708.
Id.
Id. at 709.
Id. at 726.
Id.
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EMVR. Mirror Worlds was not seeking the entire market value in
damages. In fact, Mirror Worlds was attempting to apportion the
value of the infringed patent based on the total value of the
product in which it was incorporated as a starting point for
finding a reasonable royalty.114 In such a scenario, it is illogical to
exclude from evidence the total value of the product. If Mirror
Worlds were able to provide substantial evidence that its patent
constituted precisely 1% of the market value of the product
(including the hardware), wouldn’t the starting point for a just
damages award be 1% of the profits relating to the infringing
product? And from there, the 1% profit figure could be tweaked
based on a hypothetical negotiation, presuming a licensee would
not negotiate to give up all profits related to the license.
Including the hardware in the royalty base is arguably
reasonable because an operating system is necessary to make the
hardware useful for a consumer; thus, a sufficient functional
relatedness exists between the patented component and the
product incorporating it.
Based on the following excerpt from the opinion, it seems the
court would exclude the profits from the evidence unless the
patentee could prove that the infringed features created “the
basis for customer demand” or “substantially create[d] the value
of the component parts.”115
Despite Mirror Worlds’ protestations that the entire market
value rule does not apply, it undisputedly used the entire
market value of the accused commercial products in
calculating its royalty base—and the accused products contain
several features, both accused and non-accused. Therefore,
Mirror Worlds must show the connection between the accused
commercial products, which form its royalty base, and the
patented features. Accordingly, at trial Mirror Worlds was
obligated to show that the Spotlight, Cover Flow, and Time
Machine features create the “basis for customer demand” or
“substantially create[] the value of the component parts” in the
accused software and hardware products that contain Mac OS
X 10.4–6.116
114. Id.
115. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Uniloc USA, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
116. Id. (quoting Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1318
(Fed. Cir. 2011)).
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From this excerpt, it is apparent that the district court has now
imported two concepts present in the history of patent damage
calculations that were originally applied in both lost profits and
apportionment scenarios. In apportionment, the theory of
damages sought to deprive the infringer of its unjust enrichment,
and thus, the patentee was entitled to deprive the infringer of the
entire value attributed to the patent.117 This is harsher than the
present statute because a reasonable royalty would not deprive a
hypothetical licensee from the entirety of the profits associated
with the licensed patent because a licensee would expect some
profit from the deal.118 Even so, apportionment is a necessary
element and should be treated as such in the reasonable royalty
determination, as discussed in Part II.
In lost-profits scenarios, the recovery of all of an infringer’s
profits may sometimes comport with the adequate compensation
standard; here the patentee may recover more than just the
precise value of the patent as incorporated in the infringer’s
product; it may also recover the value from reasonably
anticipated market transactions associated with the patent and
lost sales. Thus, if the infringed patent was the basis of demand,
the patentee could have arguably made all of the infringer’s
profits. But Mirror Worlds did not seek all of Apple’s profits.
Rather, it sought a reasonable royalty based on the precise value
of its patent with respect to Apple’s infringing products. The
cases discussing the EMVR following Lucent v. Gateway
unreasonably apply the same high standard—the “basis of
consumer demand” test—to two distinguishable subsets of
compensatory damages.119
117. See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 646
(1915) (stating that the burden of proof was on the patentee because it was
entitled to recover the portion of the profits attributable to the patent).
Dowagiac ended with a remand to determine apportionment, in part because of
the Westinghouse decision. Id. at 651.
118. See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152,
1157–58 (6th Cir. 1978) (“A reasonable royalty is an amount ‘which a person,
desiring to manufacture and sell a patented article, as a business proposition,
would be willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make and sell the
patented article, in the market, at a reasonable profit.’” (quoting Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion Tire Co., 95 F.2d 978, 984 (6th Cir. 1937)).
119. See Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1223 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (“[T]he purpose of compensatory damages is not to punish the infringer,
but to make the patentee whole.”).
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VI. Remedies in Copyright Law
It seems absurd to declare evidence of the actual revenues as
“irrelevant” to a reasonable royalty calculation when the
projected revenues would have most certainly been a part of that
determination in a hypothetical negotiation.120 To address this
absurdity, this Note suggests that courts draw experience from
copyright law.121 In particular, it may be of interest to look at how
courts determine remedies in a copyright infringement suit in
which the infringing work has substantial noninfringing
components. Under the copyright statute:
The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages
suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any
profits of the infringer that are attributable to the
infringement and are not taken into account in computing the
actual damages. In establishing the infringer’s profits, the
copyright owner is required to present proof only of the
infringer’s gross revenue, and the infringer is required to
prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit
attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work.122

Thus, copyright law provides a copyright holder with a right
to choose between compensation and restitution.123 Any
reasonable infringer would do everything possible to present
evidence of expenses and attributes of the work not covered by
the plaintiff’s copyright in attempting to reduce a restitutionary
award. Drawing some parallels between the copyright and the
patent statutes, one initially finds that the patent statute grants
damages “adequate to compensate for the infringement,”124 while
the copyright statute grants “actual damages” suffered as a result

120. See infra Part VII (discussing the elements of licensing valuation).
121. Cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Univ. City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439
(1984) (finding it appropriate to refer to patent law as an analogy in a copyright
case “because of the historic kinship between patent law and copyright law”).
122. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006).
123. See DOBBS, supra note 6, at 54 (“In effect, the owner may recover either
damages specified by the statute or the infringer’s profits, whichever sum is
higher.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 42, cmt. d, illus.1 & 2 (2011) (illustrating the same result under the copyright
statute).
124. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
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of the infringement.125 Both forms of recovery are compensatory.
The patent statute then provides that in no event should an
award be less than a reasonable royalty.126 This language has no
requirement that the plaintiff prove its actual loss, and thus is
not clearly compensatory in every case.127 In a case where a
patentee was not seeking to license or produce under the patent,
if a reasonable royalty is awarded, how is the award classified? It
appears such an award could be labeled quasi-restitutionary. In
such a case, looking to the defendant’s profits seems even more
justified.128 Instead of a reasonable royalty floor to recovery, the
copyright statute grants the right to completely disgorge profits
attributable to the infringement from the infringer.
Whereas the copyright holder may choose between
compensation and full restitution, the patent holder may only
choose compensation. The lack of a restitutionary option in
patent law arguably results in insufficient deterrence. When
disgorgement is an option, as in copyright law, the infringer gives
up all gains from the infringement—leaving the infringer
indifferent to the act of infringement.129 When recovery is based
solely on compensation, a liability rule has been adopted, and a
rational infringer will choose to infringe when its expected gain
exceeds the patentee’s expected loss.130 This gives an infringer
every incentive to prevent a patentee from establishing a loss.131
The patent statute does provide punitive deterrence in allowing

125. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b).
126. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
127. See DOBBS, supra note 6, at 34 n.2 (stating that “a plaintiff who is not
exploiting a patent at all will still be entitled to a reasonable royalty”).
128. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 50
cmt. e (2011) (providing that the remedy in restitution for an innocent recipient
of some unjust enrichment is measured by a “reasonable value” standard).
129. See Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and Economic
Analysis, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73, 77 (1997) (“[P]erfect disgorgement
restores the injurer to the same indifference curve as if no injury had
occurred.”).
130. See id. at 88 (“[A]ssuming certain ideal conditions including perfectly
compensatory damages, a liability rule causes efficient self-monitoring by a
rational actor.”).
131. See infra Part IX (discussing the perverse incentives created by the
present patent damages regime).

A CASE AGAINST THE ENTIRE MARKET VALUE RULE 2259
for treble damages in the event of willful infringement;132
however, willfulness is difficult to prove in practice.133
Applying the EMVR in lost-profits scenarios to award a
patentee the entire market value of a product when the patent is
the basis (but not the sole source) of demand for the product is
restitutionary, and thus contrary to the present patent statute’s
grant of a compensatory remedy.134 Applying the EMVR in
reasonable-royalty scenarios to block a patentee from basing a
royalty on the infringing product’s profits further favors an
infringer in a system that already encourages, to some extent,
efficient infringement. The EMVR has no place in patent law.
Most importantly, the copyright statute explicitly allows a
copyright holder to introduce an infringer’s profits on a larger
work into evidence without requiring proof that the infringed
component constitutes the basis of demand.
VII. An Attempt to Impart Clarity
The EMVR has evolved to its present state because the
decisionmaker in patent infringement determinations is often a
jury of laypeople. As such, the rule is not entirely without
purpose, for when a patented component contributes less than 1%
of the value of the device being sold, it becomes increasingly
difficult for an infringer to prove, for instance, that the patent is
worth 0.01%, rather than only 0.001%.135 But this problem is only
132. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
133. See Damage Relief for Patent Infringement, GALLAGHER & DAWSEY CO.
(Dec. 2002), http://www.invention-protection.com/ip/publications/docs/Damage_
Relief_for_Patent_Infringement.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2012) (providing a
practitioner’s opinion on the difficulty of proving willfulness) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
134. There is no requirement under the EMVR (as opposed to the
requirements expressed in the Panduit factors) that there be proof that the
patentee had the manufacturing capability to exploit the demand for the overall
product, or even that the patentee contemplated the idea of marketing the
overall product. See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d
1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978).
135. See LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 68 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (“Admission of such overall revenues, which have no demonstrated
correlation to the value of the patented feature alone, only serve to make a
patentee’s proffered damages amount appear modest by comparison, and to
artificially inflate the jury’s damages calculation beyond that which is adequate
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a minor issue. Assume an infringer of a minor patent made
$100,000,000 in profits on a larger device containing other
unpatented components. The difficulty in proving that the
infringed patent was worth either 0.01% or 0.001% means the
difference between a reasonable royalty of $10,000 and one of
$1,000. Considering the cost of litigation, such a difficulty in proof
is of little consequence. Only when the profits are in the billions
of dollars does the difficulty yield consequential differences, and
in such a case, the trial judge must be more demanding in
scrutinizing a damages expert’s methodology. Although it may be
easier to pinpoint a value of a patent when it contributes a
substantial portion of the value to the broader device, adoption of
the EMVR does more harm than good because it excludes
material evidence in most cases without exception.136
Let us take Uniloc to its logical conclusion when omitting the
EMVR and placing heavier weight on the evidence of profits. The
gross revenues for the products at issue were approximately
$19.28 billion.137 Microsoft’s latest profit margin, based on its
2011 annual report, was approximately 33%.138 Thus, we could
assume that the profits on the products at issue in Uniloc were
approximately $6.36 billion. Uniloc’s expert multiplied $2.50 by
the number of licenses sold to get roughly $565 million; thus
there were approximately 226 million licenses sold by
Microsoft.139 The expert’s calculation would value a reasonable
royalty (after adjusting for a hypothetical negotiation) at
approximately 8% of the profit for Microsoft Office and Windows.
To evaluate the reasonableness of this rate, it is necessary to
provide some context.

to compensate for the infringement.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
136. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty
Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2021 (2007) (providing an example of how a low
percentage royalty based on the product price might seem reasonable but may
easily exceed the royalty the parties would have negotiated, or even exceed the
entire value of the infringing component).
137. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1312 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
138. MICROSOFT CORP., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 41 (2011), available at
http://www.microsoft.com/investor/reports/ar11/download_center.html.
139. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1311.

A CASE AGAINST THE ENTIRE MARKET VALUE RULE 2261
Digital rights management (DRM) refers to methods of
preventing unauthorized use of a company’s software; the term
encompasses product activation codes.140 Microsoft’s PlayReady,
as one example to show the amount charged for DRM, is a
content access and protection technology for digital
entertainment content, products, services, and devices.141 The fee
structure for PlayReady is based on a client’s quarterly unit
volume, with the royalties per unit decreasing as unit volume
increases.142 The most expensive royalty per unit is $0.20.143
Taking this conservative rate, and assuming it is in line with
industry norms, Microsoft would have incurred a cost of about
$45,200,000 for the 226 million licenses sold (assuming it was
paying for a product comparable to its own).144 Yet the jury
awarded $388 million in damages.145 Based on this rough
estimate, the jury’s award was more than eight times the value
that Microsoft charges for its own DRM software. Considering
this large difference, it would not be a stretch for a judge to rule
that no reasonable jury could find that the evidence supported a
$388 million award.146 Notice how the reasonableness of an
award can be attacked at the trial level without any reference,
and therefore without any need, for the EMVR.
140. Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, Should Copyright Owners Have to
Give Notice of Their Use of Technical Protection Measures?, 6 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 41, 42 (2007) (“[S]ome copyright owners have adopted technical
protection measures (or ‘TPMs’, sometimes also referred to as ‘digital rights
management’ or ‘DRM’ technologies) to control unauthorized access to and uses
of digital content in mass-market products and services.”).
141. Microsoft PlayReady: Overview, MICROSOFT CORP., http://www.
microsoft.com/playready/overview (last visited Oct. 12, 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
142. Id. It appears that Microsoft has taken the fee structure cited herein off
of its website. See www.diigo.com/item/image/8c52/5wt6?size=o for a clipped
version.
143. Fee
Structure
for
Microsoft
PlayReady
Final
Products,
http://www.microsoft.com/playready/PFPLFees.mspx (last visited Feb. 4, 2012).
Check the website mentioned in note 142 if this site is no longer available.
144. This figure does not apply the tiered royalties per unit that the fee
structure would in actuality. Id. This is conservative because it applies the
highest rate to all licenses.
145. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1311 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
146. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50 (stating the standard for granting a judgment as
a matter of law).
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Admittedly, the above analysis is not entirely accurate
considering that the patents covering PlayReady (assuming they
exist) were not at issue in Uniloc. But the analysis can be
supported as relevant because the marginal production cost of
software is typically near zero.147 This low marginal cost would
apply to both the product activation code at issue in Uniloc as
well as the code for Microsoft PlayReady. Thus, it is reasonable to
assume the costs per unit and the sale price of the two DRM
programs, when dealing with economies of scale, would be
comparable.
Perhaps contributing to excessive, misinformed jury awards
are the sometimes confusing jury instructions. Looking at a
standard jury instruction, the contradictions in logic would
confuse a lawyer, let alone a layperson: “A reasonable royalty is
the royalty that would be reasonable for the infringer to pay and
for the patent owner to accept for use of a patent that they both
know is valid and that the infringer wants to use.”148 The
instruction then provides: “You are to decide what a reasonable
royalty would be based on circumstances as of the time just
before [defendant] began [selling or using] the infringing [product
or process].”149 Taking this sentence literally, the actual profits of
the product, including the infringed patent, would seemingly be
precluded from consideration. But the jury instruction then
provides a list of factors the jury should consider, including “the
portion of the profit that is due to the patented invention, as
compared to the portion of the profit due to other factors, such as
unpatented elements or unpatented manufacturing processes, or
features or improvements developed by [defendant].”150 The
instruction, like the case law, contradicts itself. It asks the jury to
base its royalty as of the time of initial infringement but, at the
same time, to consider the actual profits attributed to the patent
that necessarily incur after this point in time. It would be wise to
eliminate the contradiction and tell the jury that when an
infringer cannot prove lost profits, a reasonable royalty informed
147. Matt E. Thatcher & Dave E. Pingry, Understanding the Business Value
of Information Technology Investments: Theoretical Evidence from Alternative
Market and Cost Structures, 21 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 61, 64 (2004).
148. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: PATENT LITIG. 197 (2005).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 198.
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by the infringer’s profits (amongst other factors) should be
determined.151
The primary forces driving royalty rates for intellectual
property are the amount of profits, the duration of profits, and
the risk associated with the expected profits.152 In licensing, “[t]he
basis of all value is cash.”153 And to determine net cash flow, one
must take into account gross revenues.154
In light of the above analysis, this Note proposes a change to
the test that courts apply when determining whether to exclude
total product revenue (en route to finding profits) from evidence:
A patentee may recover damages associated with the value of an
entire apparatus containing several features when the feature
patented constitutes some basis for customer demand and there is
a sufficient functional relatedness between the patented feature
and the product.155 This change is suggested in the spirit of
eventually abrogating a rigid test entirely in moving toward
judges’ increased scrutiny of experts under Daubert and their
increased willingness to grant judgments notwithstanding a jury
verdict on damages. The United States District Court for the
District of Delaware has, at least in one case, interpreted the rule
in a way that most aligns with the spirit behind this change. In
Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Newbridge Networks Corp.,156 the
district court stated: “[T]he test for the application of the entire
market value rule is not whether the unpatented products are
151. This assumes that the patentee has provided sufficient evidence to
prove the value that the patent contributed to the product.
152. RUSSELL PARR, ROYALTY RATES FOR LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
124 (2007).
153. Id. at 143.
154. See id. at 144 (providing a basic net cash flow calculation).
155. This language (other than the emphasized change) was taken from
TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations
omitted). Courts have impliedly rejected this change. For example, in Schindler
Elevator Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 561 F. Supp. 2d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), the
court granted a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of plaintiff’s damages
expert because it relied on proof that the infringed patent was a substantial
basis for consumer demand rather than the higher standard requiring that it
was the basis for consumer demand. See Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Otis
Elevator Co., 1-06-cv-05377 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2011) (granting motion in
limine).
156. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Newbridge Networks Corp., 168 F. Supp. 2d 181
(D. Del. 2001).
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necessary for the device to operate . . . but whether a hypothetical
licensee would have anticipated an increase in sales of collateral
unpatented items because of the patented device.”157
VIII. Support from the Federal Rules of Evidence
Presumably because the EMVR originated before the current
Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted, there are no cases
discussing how the EMVR comports with these rules of
evidence.158 Originally, it did not operate as an evidence rule at
all. As applied today, does the EMVR make sense in light of
Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403? In general, relevant
evidence is admissible unless the United States Constitution, a
federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or rules prescribed
by the Supreme Court provide otherwise.159 The EMVR did
originate in the U.S. Supreme Court, and thus it is arguably a
rule prescribed by it.160 But when the Supreme Court has invoked
the EMVR, it has never been in association with reasonable
royalties—it has been in association with restitutionary
remedies.161 Thus, the Supreme Court exception to relevancy
should not apply to the EMVR as perverted.
Is the amount of profits made on a complex device
incorporating a patented subcomponent relevant in determining a
reasonable royalty if the patent is infringed? This question turns
on whether the evidence “has any tendency to make a fact [here,
what a reasonable royalty would be] more or less probable than it
would be without the evidence; and [whether] the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.”162 The argument
opposing relevancy would be that the actual profits on a device
157. Id. at 238.
158. See Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and
Proceedings, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (showing that the rules
were not codified until the 1970s).
159. FED. R. EVID. 402.
160. See Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884) (applying the EMVR).
161. The EMVR was imposed in reasonable royalty determinations by the
United States Court of Claims. See Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States,
99 Ct. Cl. 1 (1942), aff’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds by 320
U.S. 1 (1943).
162. FED. R. EVID. 401.
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incorporating the patent are not relevant because the valuation
method relies on a hypothetical negotiation before the product
was manufactured and sold; thus, the actual value would not
have yet come into existence for consideration.163 Further, the
irrelevancy argument may point to the possibility that without
proof of some value to the patent, the profits of the device in
which it is incorporated mean nothing in ascertaining the value
of the patent to any precision.
Taking the first argument, Georgia-Pacific has fleshed out
the elements indicative of a reasonable royalty, and among these
elements is the “established profitability of the product made
under the patent.”164 The hypothetical negotiation was not meant
to totally preclude consideration of events occurring after the
initial infringement. Rather, it is to be determined in context. The
second irrelevancy argument is stronger, and certainly the
patentee should prove some benefit to the overall product before
being able to introduce profits of the product incorporating the
infringed patent among other patented or unpatented
components. But if the infringed patent had no value whatsoever,
why would the infringer find it necessary to include it in its
device? Once the patent is found infringed, unless there are no
profits on the broader device, the existence of some value
attributed to the patent might be presumed. Whether that value
is ten cents or ten million dollars is for the jury to decide. The
evidence of profits is relevant to this determination.
Even so, a “court may exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or
more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.”165 Thus, if the market value is
relevant under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402, which it
likely is, then do any of the above considerations substantially
outweigh the probative value of the actual profit of the broader
device on the proper amount of a reasonable royalty? If there is a
163. See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152,
1164 (6th Cir. 1978) (“The infringer’s profit element, in the post-judgment
‘reasonable royalty’ equation, is not related to the infringer’s actual profit.”).
164. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
165. FED. R. EVID. 403.

2266

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2233 (2012)

functional relatedness between the infringed patent and the
overall product, and proof of this relatedness to some degree of
consumer demand, the answer is “not always.”166
Presuming the existence of these elements, there is no
persuasive argument that there is unfair prejudice against the
infringer. The argument for unfair prejudice might be that if a
jury sees a large profit figure it will be more inclined to think the
infringer can afford a large award even if the award does not
reflect the true value of the infringed patent. Based on that
inclination, the jury will unfairly value the patent in the
patentee’s favor. Perhaps it would be unfair if the parties only
introduced net profits into evidence and sent the jury to
deliberate. But the parties employ experts to put that figure into
context. The infringer has every opportunity to explain how the
device operates, why it is attractive to consumers, and how the
other elements contribute to the product’s value. It is not unfair
to require an infringer to explain its product.167
Nor does the amount of profits tend to mislead the jury.
Expert valuations will incorporate expected profits and actual
profits. As stated earlier, the basis of value is cash flow.168 Thus,
to determine the value attributable to the infringed patent, the
necessary cash value is the profit made. When the entire device is
not infringing, the profit attributable to the infringed component
must be apportioned from the total profit made en route to
determining a reasonable royalty. In summary, the Federal Rules
of Evidence do not support a categorical bar to admitting an
infringer’s profits into evidence in reasonable royalty
determinations (even when the patent isn’t the basis for demand),
166. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(requiring a functional relationship between the infringed patent and the
product to allow recovery based on unpatented components sold with patented
components).
167. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 136, at 2024 (stating that in practice,
it is rare for an infringer to introduce evidence of other patented components).
The Article explains that such evidence is rare because an infringer usually will
“not want to admit that it might be infringing other patented inventions.” Id.
Further contributing to the dearth of this type of evidence is courts’ reluctance
to admit evidence of patents other than that at issue in the trial. See id.
(“[C]ourts do not want to admit such evidence because it will require collateral
litigations during the damages phase over the existence and value of parts of the
product that are not covered by the patent at trial.”).
168. See PARR, supra note 152, at 143.
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provided there is a functional relatedness between the infringed
patent and the broader product and that some value to the patent
can be proven or inferred.169 Of course, this determination is
inherently fact-specific.
Courts have stated that without the EMVR requirement, “an
infringer could be required to pay multiple recoveries on a single
product to numerous patentees, each of whom file infringement
claims directed to different components of the product without
regard to the extent to which its patented component contributed
to the overall profitability of the product.”170 But this logic does
not extend to calculating a reasonable royalty based on profits
because, in attempting to formulate a reasonable royalty, the
precise goal is to determine the extent to which the patent
contributed to overall profitability.
Some decisions have explicitly recognized the relevancy of
the infringer’s profits in assessing the reasonableness of a royalty
award. The United States District Court for the District of
Delaware has stated that “[w]here the commercial value of a
product is increased by the use of the patented process and
infringement is present, profits are considered a relative
element.”171
IX. Harmonizing Patent Damages with the Goals of Patent Law
Congress’s power to grant limited monopolies in the form of
patents is to be used “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the
useful Arts.”172 The right to exclude others from making, using, or

169. See Roberts, supra note 58, at 670 (“Measuring the infringer’s profits
may sometimes provide a useful proxy for assessing the patent owner’s
compensatory loss.”). Certain circumstances may justify excluding profits from
evidence.
170. Izume Prods. Co. v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V., 315 F. Supp. 2d
589, 614 (D. Del. 2004).
171. Hartford Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. E.F. Drew & Co., 188 F. Supp. 353,
358–59 (D. Del. 1960); see also Locklin v. Switzer Bros., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 904,
906 (N.D. Cal. 1964) (stating that “an infringer’s profits may have an
evidentiary bearing on the determination of the reasonableness of a royalty”).
172. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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selling a patented invention provides encouragement for taking
investment-based risk in developing new technologies.173
If the entire market value is excluded in cases in which the
patent does not constitute the basis of demand for the product,
proving a reasonable royalty becomes significantly more
difficult—especially if a court decides to exclude evidence of other
patents incorporated in the device. Intentional infringers know
this, so the EMVR as applied produces a moral hazard for an
infringer to aggressively market the infringing product in hopes
of eliminating any chance for the patentee to establish a record of
sales that could support an award of lost profits, thus relegating a
patentee to the reasonable royalty remedy. The infringer’s
aggressive marketing would also reduce the likelihood that a
patentee could successfully negotiate a license for the patent with
a potential competitor to the infringer due to the infringer’s head
start on manufacturing and advertising and the consequent
reluctance of a competitor to enter a saturated market. This
would tend to prevent an actual royalty rate from being
established. Thus the patentee is put in the position of trying to
prove a reasonable royalty without evidence of established rates
and, under the EMVR, without reference to the infringer’s profits
made on a device incorporating the patent. An infringer has every
incentive to put the patentee in this position because it
substantially impairs the patentee from rebutting a low-ball
royalty suggestion from the infringer’s expert.
The goals of promoting technological advancement are not
furthered when inventors cannot get adequate compensation for a
violation of their right to exclude. Entities investing in innovation
theoretically take the risk of being inadequately compensated for
infringement of a potential patent into account—this risk
arguably stymies investment to a certain extent. In encouraging
investment in the technical arts, it is better to overcompensate
patentees in rare instances rather than undercompensate them
in most instances of infringement. This idea is supported by the
patent statute’s inference that a reasonable royalty is the floor to
a potential damages award.174
173. King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
174. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (stating that in no event is the owner of an
infringed patent to be awarded less than a reasonable royalty).
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X. Conclusion
Some scholars believe that the EMVR has no place in
reasonable royalty cases.175 Professor Mark Lemley has said that
applying the EMVR “necessarily overcompensates the patent
owner by giving it value not in fact attributable to the patent.”176
This Note agrees with the inapplicability of the rule, but not with
Professor Lemley’s reasoning. The rule has no place in a
reasonable royalty calculation not because the market value of a
product should always be excluded from evidence when the
patent at issue covers only a portion of the product, but because
such evidence should almost always be included. In most cases,
“market value” should more narrowly refer to net profits as long
as the infringer has kept adequate records with good-faith
accounting for revenues and expenses (and was not unreasonably
inefficient). A patentee is not necessarily overcompensated when
the royalty base includes the entire product, but it is
overcompensated if a judge fails to properly scrutinize damages
experts’ methodologies in comparing a royalty rate to net profits
or if a judge fails to grant a judgment as a matter of law in the
case of an unreasonable award. When an infringer seeks
judgment as a matter of law on a reasonable-royalty award that
is not reasonably linked to the profits attributed to the patent, a

175. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable
Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655, 663–64 (2009) (“The logic of the entire
market value rule breaks down in reasonable royalty cases . . . .”). “Until courts
abandon current doctrine and apply the entire market value rule only when the
patented component of the accused devices truly accounts for the entire market
demand for the infringed device, patentees will continue to be unjustly
rewarded.” Brian J. Love, Patentee Overcompensation and the Entire Market
Value Rule, 60 STAN. L. REV. 263, 293 (2007) . For a sure-to-be rewarding trek
into mathematics, the reader ought to consider that the mathematical proof in
Love’s Note might assume its own conclusion. See id. at 273–75 (concluding that
when a reasonable royalty is based on the entire value of a device, the
benchmark royalty will only be achieved if the infringing component accounts
for the entire value of the accused product). That is, VEMVR was assumed to be
vproduct in reaching this conclusion. Id. at 275. Should not vproduct have been
included in the summation of individual patents such that the only conclusion to
draw would be that B*vproduct = B*VEMVR - B*∑ v (assuming that vproduct= v1 in
the summation)? See id.
176. Lemley, supra note 175, at 664.
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trial judge should find that no reasonable person would find the
award supported by sufficient evidence.177
In limiting any unfair prejudice, a court should only admit
into evidence the profits made on a product that are functionally
tied to the patented component when the patent is shown to have
provided some value; the patentee should then prove with
sufficient evidence the profit of the entire product that is
attributable to the patent.178 The limitation on a patentee’s
purported royalty base should be the functional nexus plus “some
value” standard, not a “basis of consumer demand” or
“substantially creates demand” standard. It may be possible to
infer value based on positive net profits. Once some value for the
patent is established by the patentee, the defendant has the
opportunity to rebut by attempting to highlight the value
attributed to the other features of the machine. Once these
elements are established, the valuation for reasonable royalty
purposes should typically be in reference to the profits, not the
revenues. The inherent uncertainties in valuation are thereby
limited. Furthermore, this reference to profits of the entire device
compensates the patentee for the synergistic value of the patent,
rather than the value of the patent in a vacuum. It is fair to
assume that an infringer/hypothetical licensee would take this
into account when negotiating a license even if the patent is not
expected to cover a component that is the basis of demand.
In summary, courts have taken a restitutionary sword from
plaintiffs and reforged it into a shield for defendants in a
177. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Nova Chems. Corp., No. 05-737-JJF, 2010 WL
3056617, at *1 (D. Del. July 30, 2010) (“[A] court may grant judgment as a
matter of law if ‘the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally
sufficient evidentiary basis’ to find for a party on a given issue after that party
has been fully heard.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a))).
178. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(“[W]hen recovery is sought on sales of unpatented components sold with
patented components . . . the unpatented components must function together
with the patented component in some manner so as to produce a desired end
product or result.”). Thus, this Note’s proposed revision to reasonable royalties
in patent damages law would maintain the functional nexus requirement while
dropping the “basis for consumer demand” requirement. Ultimately, upon
review, the findings at trial will be judged on a substantial evidence standard.
See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(stating that on appellate review, findings of fact are reviewed on a substantial
evidential support standard).
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compensatory system. The result will not be more reasonable
awards, but rather awards that are more likely to be arbitrary
and a system that inadequately deters infringement.

